# Post-Election Audit Summary 

## November 6, 2018 General Election

Governor and Lieutenant Governor<br>Treasurer of State<br>Court of Common Pleas, General Division, FTC 1-7-2019

Beginning on December 6, 2018 we conducted a Risk-Limiting Post-Election Audit for the November 2018 General Election. There were 492,323 total ballots cast in the election. A total of 38 unique batches were audited, consisting of a hand count of 12,359 ballots from the audited contests. The accuracy rate for the postelection audit is $100 \%$.

Audited contest and batch details are provided below:

| RACE | TOTAL <br> BALLOTS <br> CAST | UNIQUE BATCHES AUDITED | TOTAL <br> BALLOTS <br> AUDITED | NUMBER OF PRECINCTS IN CONTEST |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Governor and Lieutenant Governor | 492,323 | 10 | 3,150 | 975 |
| Treasurer of State | 492,323 | 9 | 2,764 | 975 |
| Court of Common Pleas, General Division, FTC 1-7-2019 | 492,323 | 19 | 6,445 | 975 |

Our Risk-Limiting Audits are based upon the Kaplan-Markov method as explained by Philip B. Stark and Mark Lindeman. Auditing best practices recommend we split up the total ballots cast by precinct into multiple batch types. We utilize five batch types each consisting of one single ballot type category: Absentee, Election Day, Provisional, Post Absentee, and Post Election Day.

A master spreadsheet is created for each contest with statistical formulas to determine the number of batches that must be audited in order to reach a $90 \%$ confidence level. This confidence level means the audit has at least a $90 \%$ probability of leading to a full recount if the apparent outcome is incorrect.

We use a "Probability Proportional to Error Bound with Replacement" selection method. We assign numbers ranging from 000000 through 999,999 for each batch within each contest. Unique ranges of numbers are allocated to specific batches based upon their error bound - i.e. the greater the possibility of a miscount within a batch, the more numbers assigned, and the more likely it is to be selected. For example, if a single batch has a high probability of a miscount, multiple numbers are assigned to that single batch, making the random selection of that batch more likely during the audit. Each of those individual numbers might be randomly selected and included in the overall batch audit requirement, but the single batch to which those numbers are assigned needs to be audited only once. To obtain the precinct batch number we roll differently colored dice numbered $0-9$, each one of the colored dice representing one digit of the batch number.

Governor and Lieutenant Governor

| NUMBER <br> PRECINCT NAME <br> OF TIMES <br> SELECTED | SELECTED <br> BATCH TYPE | OFFICIAL <br> BALLOTS <br> CAST | AUDIT <br> HAND <br> COUNT | DIFFERENCE <br> DISCREPANCY |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| BEDFORD HEIGHTS -01-C | 1 | Election Day | 293 | 293 | 0 |
| BROADVIEW HEIGHTS -02-C | 1 | Election Day | 502 | 502 | 0 |
| CLEVELAND -01-G | 1 | Election Day | 233 | 233 | 0 |
| CLEVELAND -03-E | 1 | Election Day | 258 | 258 | 0 |
| CLEVELAND -05-K | 1 | Absentee | 42 | 42 | 0 |
| CLEVELAND HEIGHTS -04-B | 1 | Election Day | 333 | 333 | 0 |
| FAIRVIEW PARK -03-B | 1 | Election Day | 456 | 456 | 0 |
| STRONGSVILLE -03-B | 1 | Election Day | 439 | 439 | 0 |
| UNIVERSITY HEIGHTS -00-E | 1 | Absentee | 212 | 212 | 0 |
| WARRENSVILLE HTS -06-A | 1 | Election Day | 382 | 382 | 0 |
| TOTAL |  | - | $\mathbf{3 , 1 5 0}$ | $\mathbf{3 , 1 5 0}$ | $\mathbf{0}$ |

Treasurer of State

| NUMBER <br> PRECINCT NAME <br> SELIMES | SELECTED <br> BATCH TYPE | OFFICIAL <br> BALLOTS <br> CAST | AUDIT <br> HAND <br> COUNT | DIFFERENCE <br> DISCREPANCY |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| CLEVELAND -15-B | 1 | Absentee | 204 | 204 | 0 |
| CLEVELAND -17-C | 1 | Election Day | 329 | 329 | 0 |
| EAST CLEVELAND -02-A | 1 | Absentee | 106 | 106 | 0 |
| EUCLID -07-C | 1 | Election Day | 331 | 331 | 0 |
| PARMA HEIGHTS -01-B | 1 | Election Day | 418 | 418 | 0 |
| ROCKY RIVER -03-D | 1 | Election Day | 418 | 418 | 0 |
| SHAKER HEIGHTS -00-L | 1 | Election Day | 453 | 453 | 0 |
| SOUTH EUCLID -04-B | 1 | Absentee | 141 | 141 | 0 |
| UNIVERSITY HEIGHTS -00-B | 1 | Election Day | 364 | 364 | 0 |
| TOTAL |  | - | $\mathbf{2 , 7 6 4}$ | $\mathbf{2 , 7 6 4}$ | $\mathbf{0}$ |

Court of Common Pleas, General Division, FTC 1-7-2019

| PRECINCT NAME | NUMBER <br> OF TIMES SELECTED | SELECTED BATCH TYPE | OFFICIAL <br> BALLOTS CAST | AUDIT <br> HAND <br> COUNT | $\begin{aligned} & \text { DIFFERENCE } \\ & \text { DISCREPANCY } \end{aligned}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| BEDFORD -01-A | 1 | Election Day | 301 | 301 | 0 |
| BEDFORD -01-B | 1 | Election Day | 209 | 209 | 0 |
| BROADVIEW HEIGHTS -04-D | 1 | Election Day | 381 | 381 | 0 |
| CLEVELAND -03-E | 1 | Election Day | 258 | 258 | 0 |
| HUNTING VALLEY -00-A | 1 | Election Day | 194 | 194 | 0 |
| LAKEWOOD -01-A | 1 | Election Day | 403 | 403 | 0 |
| LAKEWOOD -01-H | 1 | Election Day | 491 | 491 | 0 |
| MAPLE HEIGHTS -03-B | 1 | Absentee | 172 | 172 | 0 |
| MIDDLEBURG HEIGHTS -01-B | 1 | Absentee | 144 | 144 | 0 |
| MORELAND HILLS -00-A | 1 | Absentee | 336 | 336 | 0 |
| MORELAND HILLS -00-B | 1 | Election Day | 463 | 463 | 0 |
| NORTH OLMSTED -03-F | 1 | Election Day | 451 | 451 | 0 |
| PARMA -02-E | 1 | Election Day | 497 | 497 | 0 |
| RICHMOND HEIGHTS -04-A | 1 | Election Day | 520 | 520 | 0 |
| ROCKY RIVER -03-C | 1 | Absentee | 264 | 264 | 0 |
| SOLON -02-B | 1 | Absentee | 206 | 206 | 0 |
| STRONGSVILLE -04-C | 1 | Election Day | 510 | 510 | 0 |
| STRONGSVILLE -04-G | 1 | Election Day | 410 | 410 | 0 |
| WESTLAKE -05-D | 1 | Absentee | 235 | 235 | 0 |
| TOTAL |  | - | 6,445 | 6,445 | 0 |

## Historical Post-Election Audit Accuracy Rate



